of the fear transmission in response to negative market moves; largely depending on overlaps in trading hours, this has become even stronger post-crisis for the US, while for BRIC countries has gone back towards pre-crisis levels.
Introduction
Since its inception, the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) represents a quick and important measure of market sentiment (Whaley, 2000) as it gives an immediate snapshot of market expectations of near-term (next 30 calendar days) volatility conveyed by the S&P500 stock index option prices. The appellation of "fear index", is due to how the * We are grateful to Gabriele Gaggero for his initial assistance to this work.
VIX reacts to market fluctuations, as the VIX works better in capturing market downtrends. This is because the weighted blend of Call and Put options forming it is mostly used to hedge against market drawdowns (Whaley, 2009) , so that the VIX mirrors the investors' demand for hedging and highlights the rise in this demand.
The role of VIX as natural barometer for the riskiness of financial markets has been widely assessed and described in the literature, mainly with a focus on the relationships with the US equity market. In the seminal work of (Fleming et al., 1995) , a multivariate regression model investigates the intertemporal relationships between VIX and S&P100 index 1 at various lags and leads. Major findings include: (i) the role of VIX as a fear gauge since it exhibits a statistically significant inverse relationship with the US equity index; (ii) the asymmetry of VIX in representing the impact of positive and negative US equity index returns. Besides, (Whaley, 2000) describes the behavior of VIX during US equity market turmoil, identifying a kind of alert threshold (30%) that separates high from low volatility periods. Nevertheless, (Whaley, 2009 ) dampen the role of this threshold, and highlights how the capability of VIX in reflecting the current state of the economy should be accompanied by a deepest analysis of past conditions affecting the market. (Sarwar, 2012a ) extends the analysis in (Fleming et al., 1995) investigating the relationships among the VIX and three US indexes, namely the S&P100, the S&P500 and the S&P600, during the period 1992-2011. Results are aligned with previous studies, and underline a negative simultaneous relationship, which tend to increase during more volatile periods and to decrease elsewhere. The role of VIX as a fear gauge for the S&P500 index has been also discussed in (Chiang, 2012) who discovers an asymmetric response of the VIX to negative returns using a bivariate GARCH model with TAR (Threshold Auto-Regression) in the period 2001-2011.
Cross-country and spillover effects between VIX and foreign equity markets have been also discussed in various works. (Sarwar, 2012b ) applies the (Fleming et al., 1995) model for testing VIX interactions with BRIC countries in the period 1993-2007.
Results underline that VIX is a fear gauge for China and Brazil during the whole period, and for India during the sub-period 1993-1997. A similar investigation is carried on for six European countries in the 1998-2013 timeframe (Sarwar, 2014) Our goals and results go towards at least two directions. First, we aim at shedding some lights on the statistical representation of VIX with a focus on changes in regimes.
In particular, we provide evidence of four structural breaks in the VIX mean level: this allows us to distinct the VIX impact before, throughout, after the crisis, and in the six years after the post-crisis period (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) . Notably, within this latter period, the VIX reverted in mean at pre-crisis levels between 2012 and 2016, to stabilize at lowest levels ever in the period 2016-2018. The results highlight a change in regime almost every two years; a big difference in comparison with the period 1993-2007 that encompasses only two breaks (Sarwar, 2012b The VIX and all the other indexes are retrieved from S&P CapitalIQ database 2 . We use the same indexes as in (Sarwar, 2012b) , with the exception of Russian IMOEX that replaces the AK&M index. The rationale of this substitution resides in considering the MOEX more representative of the Russian financial situation than the AK&M which is released by a rating agency. We selected only days in which the VIX has been traded, due to its central role in this analysis. Moreover, we deal with missing observations by filling gaps with linear interpolation of adjacent available observations.
The peculiar feature of this dataset is that opening and closing hours for trading vary for each index: with respect to the UTC time zone, China (SHSEC) opens first and closes before the VIX opening time. The same applies for India (BSESN), while Russia (IMOEX) and Brazil (IBOV) are the only countries with partially (Russia) or nearly (Brazil) overlapping trading windows to the VIX. The VIX and the selected US market (SPX) share the same opening and closing times.
This opening and closing hours setup directly affects the interaction among the VIX and BRIC stock indexes: (Sarwar, 2012b) , for example, found strong evidence of relationships among the VIX and the current value of US, China, India and Brazil indexes, indicating that the relation is always stronger within 24 hours. An index like the Chinese SHSEC, that opens before the VIX, however, should not be immediately conditioned by this latter, because investors will react to today's VIX information during next market opening. Therefore, an eventual dependence between VIX and SHSEC should be captured better by lead parameters, because the SHSEC is ex post influenced by the fear index. Indeed, we do not expect the VIX to be influenced by emerging markets as BRIC: in this case, however, the relationship should be captured
by lag values, since the BRIC indexes release information before the VIX opening hour.
A preliminary analysis of VIX in search for structural breaks
In general, model estimation is a task that can be affected by heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity in and between the variables under consideration.
However, the estimation results may be also influenced by not identified structural breaks: the presence of structural breaks, in fact, indicates changes in the data generating process, so that relationships with other series may consistently vary.
Already (Guo & Wohart, 2006) Results underpin the presence of four structural breaks, and five regimes at the mean level in total. We were able to link those structural breaks with four major events that we try to assess this evidence in a more quantitative way by looking at median and percentile ranges for daily closing VIX levels, in Table 2 . Looking at Table 2 , for the whole sample (first row, with the label "Full") and for each regime under examination, we report the number of observations, seven percentiles in ascendant order from 5% to 95%, and two Normal ranges: the 50% (90%) one is obtained by subtracting the 25% (95%) percentile from the 75% (5%) percentile. The 50% percentile is the median VIX closing value: for the full sample it is at 17.01%, i.e.
the VIX, with a probability of 0.5, for the next year should maintain between 13.48% and 22.96%. However, as highlighted in (Whaley, 2009 ) these results are meaningless
if not compared with historical values. To such aim, we made two comparisons. First, we compared our findings with those in (Whaley, 2000) , who examined the VIX in the period 1986-1999. Whaley's sample includes a financial crisis (1987) and a market mini-crash (1989), so we expect to find in our samples quite similar median and percentile ranges. To support this assertion, we may observe that in the period studied by Whaley the VIX has a median value of 17.30%, with the probability of 50% of lying in the range 12.97% -23.04%; these values are very close to those examined in our case. Nevertheless, when moving to Normal ranges (in the latest right-hand columns of 
Descriptive Statistics
We are now going to provide descriptive statistics for the time series analyzed in the paper: relevant values are highlighted in Table 3 for VIX, the changes in VIX (cVIX thereinafter) as well as US and BRIC stock index returns; statistics are reported for both the whole observation period and for all the identified regimes. The cVIX values are scaled by a factor of 100. finally, during the last period (Regime 5) it settles to its lowest level. The dualism between Regime 2 and Regime 5 is also supported by considering that while in the former the VIX reached its highest peak (80.86%), in the latter, the VIX reverted to its lowest value ever (9.14%). Finally, most of the series along the full sample and the subsamples show a slightly negative autocorrelation. This is in line with the findings of (Fleming et al., 1995) : the VIX does not exhibit seasonality patterns, while changes in VIX are slightly autocorrelated.
The remarks in previous rows support the decision of using cVIX instead of VIX to estimate the intertemporal relationships between the VIX and stock market indexes.
First, intuitively, changes into expected volatility reflect what investors may be worried from. Second, a regression involving raw VIX values and prices would lead to spurious estimations: from last column in Table 3 , in fact, we can see that while cVIX and index returns are stationary, both the VIX and index prices are not.
Methodology
Inspired by the works of (Fleming et al., 1995) The model has a long and well-established track in investigating the relationship between market indexes and the VIX. Table 4 lists all the works using this model to address the VIX fear gauge role. For each work, we showed the dependent and independent variables, the countries of interest, the period of analysis and the estimation methodology. Going back to the model, it allows considering five temporal relationships at once: let us denote by t the reference trading time, then t-1 and t-2 identify two lags, while t+1 and t+2 indicate two leads. Index returns for each examined market were then regressed for any of the above lag and lead against current changes in the VIX value.
For the generic country s, we therefore have:
Here c is the change in the VIX at time t; is the intercept of the regression, , + On the contrary, in case of low or even in the absence of overlapping trading hours, when the country index closes before (after) VIX opening, the delayed values assume greater importance -and a higher value in absolute terms -since they capture a kind of backward/forward shift in the VIX effect. Nevertheless, (Sarwar, 2012b) find that the relationship between BRIC stock markets index which trade before the VIX closing time and cVIXt is well captured by , and , +1 .
To conclude, we examine the role of | |, , that is a proxy of market sentiment: when negative (positive), the market volatility should equivalently tend to decrease (increase). Besides, for i=0, we use | |, also to calculate the sums + = , + | |, and − = , − | |, , which are the contemporaneous responses to positive and negative market shifts and give indications about the eventual asymmetry between cVIX t and the stock market returns. In order to evaluate which of them prevail on the other, we will compare the corresponding absolute values.
As final note, we underline that in (1) 
Results
In order to verify whether the VIX index has been a fear gauge for the US and the BRIC stock market indexes during the period Jan 2007 -Feb 2018, we start at first by looking at the correlation between the cVIX and the intertemporal stock index returns values;
we will then move to estimate the multivariate regression model. Table 5 lists the correlation between cVIXt and values of indexes returns at various lags and leads t+i, (i=-2,-1,0,1,2) for the whole sample (Column 2) as well as for the regimes identified in Sec. 2 (Columns 3 to 7). We are now ready to apply the multivariate regression model: Table 6 shows the intertemporal relationships for the US and BRIC stock markets estimated with (1) through the GMM procedure. The columns report the values for estimated parameters:
̂, + (with i=-2,-1,0,1,2), ̂| |, , ̂− and ̂+ , whose meaning has been already explained in Sec. 3. Standard errors are within rounded brackets and all significant at 99% confidence level, therefore we omitted to mark them by the conventionally used *** notation. To conclude, the last two columns on the right-hand side of Table 6 In conclusion, the VIX is a strong fear gauge for the US market not only during crisis but even after those critical events: this relationship maintains strong also in low volatile timeframes, as demonstrated by analyzing the 2016-2018 period. This strengthen the fear gauge role of the VIX, which is no more bounded to high volatility periods but rather extended towards low-volatility phases. At the same time, the VIX revealed being a strong fear gauge also for the BRIC stock market indexes. This effect is strictly linked with the overlapping amplitude in trading hours: in the case of IBOV, where the overlap is higher, the fear effect is stronger, and it is more pronounced for the contemporaneous coefficient. For China, India and Russia, the effect is evident both in the contemporaneous and in the lead t+1 coefficients. With the exception of IBOV, which behaves as the SPX, the BRIC indexes show a peak in their relationship with VIX during the 2008 financial crisis to decrease thereafter. In addition, for all the markets under consideration, we found strong presence of asymmetric responses to negative market returns.
Conclusion
We investigated the relationships between the CBOE VIX volatility index and the US and BRIC market indexes, with the aim of verifying to which extent the VIX can be still considered a fear gauge for them. In detail, following the work of (Sarwar, 2012b), Starting from a rigorous statistical analysis of the VIX and changes in VIX time series, we were able to identify four structural breaks in the VIX and consequently to split the whole sample into five regimes. This enhanced the capability of the multivariate regression model suggested in (Fleming et al., 1995) in estimating the relationships between VIX and the US and BRIC stock markets. In fact, the statistical analysis highlighted how during the period Jan 2007 -Feb 2018 the VIX has reached extreme values, thus indicating the greater uncertainty among investors. This uncertainty was captured by the regression model: the VIX has never been such a strong fear gauge for US market than during and after the 2008 financial crisis. Empirical evidence confirms the asymmetry response to negative returns and shows that the role of VIX for the US is tougher than as highlighted in previous works such as (Fleming et al., 1995) and (Sarwar, 2012b) and that even in low volatile periods, like during the biennium 2016 -2018, the VIX promptly reacted to market drawdowns.
Regarding to BRIC markets, our findings are aligned to those in (Sarwar, 2012b), as we are able to state that the VIX is a fear gauge especially for the Brazilian IBOV, and period. In addition, our work also supports findings in previous about the relationships between VIX and BRIC markets, thus consecrating the role of VIX as fear gauge for Brazil, China and India and also Russia.
